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The purpose of this paper is to show how William 
Walker was toppled from power after initially being so 
successful in Nicaragua.  Walker's attempt at seizing 
Nicaragua from 1855 to 1857 caused international conster- 
nation not only throughout Central America but also in the 
capitals of Washington and London. 
Within four months of entering Nicaragua with only 
fifty-seven followers. Walker had brought Nicaragua under his 
domination.  In July, 1856 Walker had himself inaugurated as 
President of Nicaragua.  However, Walker's amazing career in 
Nicaragua was to last only briefly, as the opposition of the 
Legitimists in Nicaragua coupled with the efforts of the 
other Central American nations removed Walker from power. 
Walker's ability as a military commander in the use 
of military strategy and tactics did not shine forth like 
his ability to guide and lead men. Walker did not learn 
from his mistakes.  He attempted to use the same military 
tactics over and over, especially in attempts to storm 
towns which if properly defended were practically impreg- 
nable fortresses.  Walker furthermore abandoned without a 
fight several strong defensive positions which could have 
been used to prevent or deter the Allied offensives. 
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Administratively, Walker committed several glaring errors. 
The control of the Accessory Transit Company was a very vital 
issue, but Walker dealt with it as if it were of minor im- 
portance.  The outcome of his dealings with the Accessory 
Transit Company was a great factor in his eventual overthrow 
as President of Nicaragua.  Walker's use of executions were 
inexcusable.  Individuals which could have been dealt with 
differently were executed and subsequently became martyrs. 
Militarily and administratively. Walker failed to learn from 
his mistakes and failed to judge properly the importance of 
crucial decisions. 
Because of his actions. Walker was unable to maintain 
his position in Nicaragua.  On May 1, 1857 William Walker 
and his American Phalanx were compelled to surrender to 
Commander Davis of the United States Navy at Rivas.  This 
ended Walker's first attempt at establishing himself in 
Nicaragua. 
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INTRODUCTORY NOTE 
William Walker and other adventurers of the times 
were referred to as filibusters.  Because this word has 
evolved to a new meaning since the 1850's, it is necessary 
to define properly the word filibuster at this point.  The 
word filibuster in the twentieth century is defined as "a 
member of a legislature who obstructs a bill by making long 
speeches."  However, this word is derived from the Spanish 
word filibustero, which came from the Dutch word urijbuiter. 
These words in the 1850's meant an irregular military 
adventurer, a freebooter, who made war upon another country 
with which his own was at peace, with the intent of seizing 
and holding control of the invaded land.  In the United 
States these filibusters were agents or instruments of the 
spirit of Manifest Destiny.  To enlarge the territory of 
the United States in this instance, the move was south into 
Central America.  Generally speaking, such actions of war 
were crimes against both nations, but realistically the act 
was held before popular judgment which rested upon the meas- 
ure of its success.  William Walker did not like the term 
"filibuster" for his followers, so he usually referred to 
his group as "liberators." 
CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION 
William Walker, "the gray-eyed man of destiny," 
became, in the 1850's, the storm center of political parties 
and governments on two continents.  Even though almost com- 
pletely overlooked in United States history. Walker for a 
brief period of time was a very successful filibuster, or 
military adventurer.  He played an important role in the 
Manifest Destiny Era of the United States, but probably the 
main reason his exploits are either overlooked or he is 
pictured as a tyrannical filibuster, is simply that he was 
a failure.  He had several grievous shortcomings which 
limited and curtailed his career at its zenith.  Had William 
Walker been able to exploit and sustain his initial success 
and to be totally successful, like Sam Houston or Davy 
Crockett in Texas, he would possibly be remembered as a hero 
or a great American pioneer.  Walker was a product of his 
times—a product of Manifest Destiny—a product of that 
strange breed of men who had reached the western terminus 
of the United States and now turned their restless spirits 
south to Central America and Mexico. 
■ 
It is not the purpose of this paper to either laud 
or condemn William Walker for his intentions or for his 
adventurous spirit.  To judge Walker on the basis of these 
qualities would be unfair, for looking back into the nine- 
teenth century from the latter part of the twentieth century, 
it is difficult fairly to evaluate the man's motives and 
the pressures exerted upon him.  There is, however, a justi- 
fication for evaluating his success as a military commander 
and as an administrator, basing the judgment upon his actual 
deeds. 
William Walker was an unlikely candidate to become 
the most renowned filibuster of the 1850's.  Neither his 
mental nor his physical attributes seemed to indicate the 
character of a hard-driving, ambitious adventurer.  As a 
young lad, he was described as a "mama's" boy because he 
read to his mother everyday instead of playing outside with 
boys his own age.  William Walker was a bookish individual, 
graduating from the University of Nashville at the age of 
fourteen.  At this period in United States history, however, 
most colleges were little more than the modern high school. 
From there he went to the University of Pennsylvania where 
he earned a medical degree, and then to Europe for further 
study.  William Walker returned to Nashville to practice 
• ■ 
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medicine and became one of the leading surgeons of the city. 
However, for some reason. Walker soon tired of practicing 
medicine and moved to New Orleans where he began to read 
law and subsequently became a lawyer.  However, because of 
his mild manner, William Walker was not a very successful 
lawyer.  So again he changed careers.  This time he became 
a newspaperman in New Orleans.  For some mysterious reason— 
whether it was the plague, the death of the girl with whom 
he was in love, or because of the emergence of a fledgling 
adventurous spirit—he departed for California and the gold 
mines.  Not making it as a gold miner, he again acquired 
the newspaper habit.  Ironically enough, as William Walker 
was later accused in Nicaragua of being pro-slavery, both 
in California and New Orleans he showed in his editorials 
that he was not an ardent slavery man and he was often 
accused of publishing a "Yankee paper."  While editor of 
the New Orleans Crescent, he ridiculed the filibustering 
attempts into Cuba by Narcisco Lopez.1  Certainly none of 
his vocations or his actions up to this point seemed to 
indicate a bursting forth of the later feared William Walker. 
Walker's physical stature certainly was not the type 
that would inspire adventurous souls to follow him to distant 
lands and into battle.  He was a small man, between five feet 
I 
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three inches and five feet five inches in height and weigh- 
ing not much over a hundred pounds.  His hair and eyebrows 
were tow-white, and his pale face was covered with freckles. 
An unnamed American filibuster who had intended to join 
Walker's forces had traveled as far as Greytown, Nicaragua 
before returning to the United States.*  This filibuster 
gave a description of Walker's physical appearance as it 
had been told to him.  "His features are described as coarse 
and impassable; his square chin and long jaw denote char- 
acter, but his lips are full, and his mouth is not well 
formed."2  (See illustration l).3  Furthermore, he was a 
man of few words, no laughter, no drinking or swearing, 
and no socializing.  As Sam Absalom, a private in Walker's 
army, wrote. 
Instead of treating us like fellow-soldiers 
and adventurers in danger, upon whom he was wholly 
dependent, until his power was established, he bore 
himself like an Eastern tyrant—reserved and haughty— 
scarcely saluting when he met us—mixing not at all, 
but keeping himself close in his quarter.4 
His physical and psychological outlook certainly con- 
trasted with that of his soldiers.  An English explorer. 
; 
■ 
*This unnamed American filibuster later wrote an 
account of this adventure, which appeared in Blackwood's 
Edinburgh Magazine, entitled "Run to Nicaragua." 
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Frederick Boyle, described William Walker's followers in 
this fashion: 
Tall, upright, broadshouldered men they 
were nearly all.  Their heads were well set on, 
hands and feet small, muscles like iron...the very 
pick of the Western States—men highly thought of 
even there for reckless daring....They were simply 
the most good-natured, good-tempered fellows I ever 
met with.5 
William Walker must have been a most extraordinary 
man to be able to overcome his own personality and physical 
shortcomings, to control, to discipline, and to coalesce 
into an effective fighting force such a group of men.  Even 
more remarkable is Walker's sudden change from a man of 
journalism, law, and medicine to a cold-blooded, ruthless 
filibuster doing just the opposite of what he had criticized 
earlier.  Although this is probably one question which will 
remain forever unanswered, the answer lies somewhere in 
that nebulous realm of Manifest Destiny.  Certainly, 
California at that time was filled with men of unbounded 
passion for adventure.  These men could no longer push 
westward to new horizons, so they turned their attention 
southward.  It was probably his association with such men 
that unbridled him from his inhibitions and enabled him to 
implant in his mind his mission in life—to open new lands 
8 
for settlement for the Anglo-Saxon and to become the founder 
of an empire.  Indeed, if this was his mission in life, he 
certainly played the role to the hilt as a filibuster. 
If today William Walker is looked down upon, it is 
because he dreamed and failed.  If he had succeeded, we 
would certainly have a different image of this individual, 
and the credit for his success would have to be given to 
someone.  With William Walker at the zenith of his success, 
Anna Ella Carroll, a political writer at this time in the 
United States,  gave credit to his mother. 
But, to give the secret of Walker's rise 
from the modest school-boy of Nashville to the 
presidency of Nicaragua, we must tell you he had 
a good mother, an American woman, who loved God 
and her country, and by gentleness, affection, and 
purity, exemplified and inculcated into the mind 
of her son the faith and doctrine of our Protestant 
Bible....Walker was educated a Christian youth, and 
made proficient in Christian law.  This stimulated 
him to spread American principles, and enlisted 
the sympathy of his fellow-men in his new impor- 
tant mission of introducing a new administration 
and laws, exciting enterprise, and proclaiming 
human rights and freedom in that darkened land.6 
Whether this was the reason William Walker was able 
to become such a well-known filibuster or whether it was 
*Anna Ella Carroll, during the Civil War in the United 
States was to become an unofficial member of President Abraham 
Lincoln's cabinet. 
because he was in the right place at the right time, imbued 
with this mission of conquest. Walker became a true leader 
of men. 
10 
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CHAPTER   II 
THE   POLITICAL   SITUATION  AND   STRATEGIC 
IMPORTANCE   OF   NICARAGUA 
•■ 
Although Walker is mainly remembered for his fili- 
bustering activities in Nicaragua, his first attempt at 
filibustering was in Baja California (Lower California) 
and Sonora—respectively a district, at that time, and a 
state of Mexico.  Although it seemed from the outset that 
the whole expedition to this natural appendage of the United 
States was to be a failure, William Walker did gain valuable 
experience.  Also, he showed his indomitable spirit against 
superior odds and his unwillingness to give up until every- 
thing was lost.  Even with Baja California being a natural 
appendage of the United States, it did not excite men's 
imagination, as Nicaragua did.  With his own imagination 
fired and the irresistible star of destiny pushing him 
forward, William Walker saw in Nicaragua his golden opportunity, 
and, indeed, Nicaragua seemed to offer much to an ambitious 
young man with vision. 
Reports from Nicaragua told of lush valleys, beautiful 
mountains, magnificent lakes, and of sparkling gold waiting 
I 
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to be taken from the earth.  But these reports of Nicaragua's 
natural beauty and resources were far overshadowed by one 
pregnant point—her location.  Nicaragua, in the 1850's, 
was in the path of one of the world's major trade routes, 
and to the man with vision and a desire for power and glory, 
Nicaragua was a logical beginning.  There was no reason 
why this valuable piece of real estate should not be controlled 
by Anglo-Saxon adventurers and eventually the United States. 
Because of the dangers and difficulties of trans- 
continental transport in the United States, most American 
goods were shipped from coast to coast via Cape Horn. 
Naturally, economic interests were always looking for cheaper 
and easier means to accomplish this transport of material 
and men.  Thus, eyes were soon fastened upon the isthmus 
of Nicaragua as a transit route, as it would be more econom- 
ical and shorter.  If the United States was to be strong 
and to hold California to the Union, there had to be safe 
and easy means of transport connecting the two sections of 
the United States.  Nicaragua fitted the bill on all accounts. 
From New York to San Francisco via Cape Horn was 14,194 
nautical miles; via Panama it was only 4,992 nautical miles. 
Nicaragua, although wider than Panama (175 miles compared 
to 55 miles), was not only 500 miles shorter but also 
: 
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required only a twelve-mile journey on land.  The remainder 
was a natural water chain of the San Juan River and Lake 
Nicaragua which could be navigated by boats. 
Cornelius Vanderbilt, realizing the potential of 
the Nicaraguan isthmus, secured permission from the 
Nicaraguan government in 1849 to survey and construct a 
canal linking the Atlantic to the Pacific.  However, 
Vanderbilt, instead of building a canal, constructed a 
twelve-mile macadam road from San Juan del Sur to Virgin 
Bay.  From Virgin Bay to Fort San Carlos, large lake steamers 
would ferry passengers over Lake Nicaragua, then shallow 
draft steamers would transport passengers down the San 
Juan River to San Juan del Norte (Greytown) to await ocean 
steamers.  The road was macadamized by July, 1851, and his 
new trans isthmian facilities were incorporated into Vander- 
bilt's Accessory Transit Company on August 14, 1851.   Soon 
thousands of Americans were using the Nicaraguan isthmus as 
a transit route, averaging almost 2,000 persons a month. 
The strategic importance of the Nicaraguan isthmus, 
coupled with the political turmoil which constantly threatened 
the safety of Americans using the route, made Nicaragua ripe 
for exploit.  She only awaited the right man to enter the 
picture.  William Walker, making careful note of Nicaragua's 
: 
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natural splendor, of her strategic importance, and of her 
political turmoil, found a star on which to hitch his 
ambitions. 
Nicaragua had broken from the United Provinces of 
Central America in 1838, and ever since, she had been 
plagued with strife, dissension, and civil war.  Essen- 
tially, Nicaragua's problem resulted from a conflict of 
interest between the two cities of Leon and Granada, neither 
of which was strong enough to establish its supremacy over 
the other.  Granada's citizens were generally wealthy mer- 
chants and aristocrats because Granada had always been pri- 
marily a commercial center, and the surrounding farmland 
was dominated by a few large landholdings.  This made 
Granada the center for the Conservative or Legitimist or 
"Servile" Party.  Its political and social structure, how- 
ever, was almost exactly opposite that of Leon.  In Leon, 
there were few families of great wealth as its citizens 
were intellectuals and professionals.  The countryside 
landholdings were small.  Thus, Leon became the center for 
the Liberal or Democratic Party.  This complete difference 
between the two cities made them inevitable enemies and the 
enmity found expression in armed conflict. 
I 
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The most recent civil war in Nicaragua resulted from 
the disputed presidential election of 1853.  Both candidates- 
Don Francisco Castellon, representing the Democratic Party, 
and Don Fruto Chamorro, representing the Legitimist Party— 
claimed victory, but Chamorro, proving the most adept at 
intrigue, secured his own re-election.  Subsequently, 
Francisco Castellon and his chief aide, Maximo Jerez, fearing 
persecution, fled to Honduras.  Staying in Honduras for only 
a short time, Castellon and Jerez returned to Nicaragua on 
May 4, 1854, recruited an army, and sought to install 
Castellon as president by force.  With the exception of 
Granada, they quickly secured control of Nicaragua.  During 
a nine-month siege, Castellon and Jerez sought to dislodge 
Chamorro from Granada but were unsuccessful.  Chamorro then 
received timely aid from Guatemala, and with Castellon*s 
army decimated by disease and desertion, Chamorro's army 
burst out of Granada.  By the end of 1854, Chamorro and the 
Legitimists were apparently gaining the upper hand. 
: 
. 
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CHAPTER III 
WALKER SECURES CONTROL OF THE TRANSIT ROUTE 
To help turn the tide and because Castellon was al- 
ready familiar with American adventurers, he accepted an 
offer of American aid.  This American assistance had been 
offered by Byron Cole, friend to William Walker and pro- 
prietor of a newspaper in California for which Walker had 
worked.  In 1853, Cole went to Nicaragua ostensibly for the 
purpose of prospecting for gold there and in Honduras. 
While in Nicaragua, Cole saw in the political wrangling and 
civil war the prospect for successful intervention of 
American adventurers.  Cole offered Walker a contract to 
come to Nicaragua to aid castellon.  Cole's first contract 
was rejected by William Walker because Walker realized that 
he would be violating the Neutrality Laws of 1818 of the 
United States.1 However, Cole secured a second contract on 
December 29, 1854, which was a colonization grant and which 
allowed William Walker to provide 300 American colonists to 
settle in Nicaragua.  In return, they would be guaranteed 
the right to bear arms.  Although Walker secured the con- 
tract in February, 1855, he was unable to sail for Nicaragua 
until May 4, 1855.2 
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Not until June 16 did the Vesta, with its cargo of 
of William Walker and 57 followers, reach Realejo, Nicaragua. 
Charles W. Doubleday (already in the service of Castellon), 
Dr. J. W. Livingstone (ex-American Consul) and Colonel Felix 
Ramirez met the Vesta at Realejo and escorted William Walker 
to Leon to have an interview with Castellon.  Upon meeting 
Walker for the first time, Doubleday later remarked, "Col. 
Walker, himself, did not, at the time, impress me as the man 
of indomitable will and energy which I afterwards found him 
to be.  He was quiet and unassuming, 'as mild a mannered 
man as ever cut a throat or scuttled ship.'"3 
Castellon, dubbing the Americans as La Falange 
Americana—the American Phalanx—proposed that the Americans 
form a separate corps.4 William Walker was appointed to 
the rank of colonel in the Democratic Army and his men be- 
came naturalized citizens of Nicaragua on June 20.  Castellon 
s 
wanted William Walker's unit to assist General Jose Trinidad 
Munoz, who had replaced Jerez as commander-in-chief of the 
armed forces, in an attack on Granada.  Walker, however, 
realizing the importance of control of the transit route 
insisted that he be allowed to make that his theatre of 
operations and recapture it from the Legitimist Party.  To 
Walker, the importance of the transit route was twofold: 
■■ 
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(1)  It would give him a command independent and separate 
from General Munoz.  (2)  If he could establish and maintain 
a footing on the route, he would be able to receive recruits 
from the Americans passing over the transit line, and he 
would always have communication with both California and 
the east coast of the United States.5  The transit route 
was the key to controlling Nicaragua, and Walker wisely 
realized it.  castellon soon gave in to the pressure from 
Walker, allowed him to undertake the mission, and promised 
Walker Nicaraguan troops under the command of Colonel Felix 
Ramirez. 
Walker and his band, plus 150 Nicaraguan troops (not 
quite the 500 troops Castellon had promised), sailed from 
Realejo on the Vesta on June 23, 1855.  The troops dis- 
embarked at Agua Callito, about eighteen miles north of San 
Juan del Sur and marched inland with Rivas as their ob- 
jective. 6 They reached the town of Rivas, a strategic 
point near the transit route, on June 29, and began prep- 
aration for their attack.  Due to the layout of the town, 
Rivas, like many towns and villages in Nicaragua, was prac- 
tically an impregnable fortress if correctly defended.  Most 
Latin American towns have a central plaza with all main roads 
radiating from this central plaza.  The roads are lined with 
: 
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adobe houses adjoining one another (See illustration 2).7 
Such a layout leaves the defenders with a very advantageous 
position since the plaza, as the heart of the town, is go- 
ing to be the object of the attack.  The defenders barri- 
cade the streets at the entrance to the town and place 
cannons and riflemen down the street from the barricades. 
Even if the barricades are overrun, the cannons and rifle- 
men have open fields of fire down the street, and attacking 
troops almost have to advance down the open streets if they 
are to reach the plaza.  Walker, apparently not realizing 
the near impossibility of successfully attacking a town 
like Rivas, selected a plan of attack which favored the 
Legitimists under Colonel Manuel Bosque. 
Colonel Bosque, commander of the Legitimists at Rivas, 
not only controlled the best tactical position, but he also 
had approximately 500 troops versus Walker's total of 56 
Americans and 150 Nicaraguans.  Walker decided that his 56 
Americans alone could storm and take Rivas.  Advancing upon 
Rivas from the north, two of Walker's officers. Lieutenant 
Colonel Achilles Kewen and Major Timothy Crocker, were to 
advance simultaneously down the streets to the plaza. 
Colonel Ramirez and his 150 men were to guard the flanks 
and rear of the American troops.8 However, from the 
■• 
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beginning things began to go wrong.  At the first volley of 
fire. Colonel Ramirez and his troops immediately dispersed 
and fled from the town.  Walker and his men, although 
advancing bravely and using their fire effectively, were 
soon bottled up for almost five hours in a group of houses 
on the edge of Rivas.  On top of this, the Legitimists 
encircled Walker's small group, and had it not been for a 
desperate charge out of the encirclement. Walker would not 
only have lost his first battle in Nicaragua but also would 
never have had the chance to pursue his dream. 
The American Phalanx successfully made their exit 
first to Virgin Bay, then to San Juan del Sur, and later 
to Realejo (See map A).  Even though the American Phalanx 
was beaten, they killed seventy Legitimists while losing 
only six Americans.9 Equally important, this small group 
left a lasting impression upon the Legitimists.  According 
to William Wells, a United States citizen traveling in 
Nicaragua in the 1850's, "from that time forth it became 
generally known that in battle, to appear within 300 yards 
of our marksmen, was to die; and officers were the certain 
mark of the American sharp-shooters."10 Much of the effec- 
tiveness of firepower was due to the American long rifles 
and Colt revolvers, which were immensely superior to the 
Legitimists' muskets.11 
i 
MAP A 
These uf.ns reprinted in part from Mapa: La 
^epul-lloa de Nlo:-,r ;-<-,, whloh is printed 1 y 
General Drafting Company. 
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Luckily for Walker, for some reason. Colonel Bosque 
did not pursue his retreating army.  Certainly both com- 
manders are in line for criticism for their tactical 
decisions.  Walker should have realized that only fifty- 
six troops could not successfully carry the town of Rivas. 
Furthermore, if Walker had reconnoitered the area more 
thoroughly, he would have realized the near impregnability 
of Rivas, especially in a daylight attack using the streets. 
Walker can be partially excused for this grievous error 
once, but it was not one that should be repeated.  Colonel 
Bosque comes into criticism because he failed to pursue and 
destroy the retreating Americans.  He definitely should 
have more closely followed the principle of the offensive. 
Furthermore, once his troops had surrounded the American 
Phalanx, there was no excuse for allowing the Americans to 
escape the encirclement. 
Upon reaching Realejo on July 12, Walker accused 
Colonel Ramirez and General Munoz for treachery which caused 
his defeat at Rivas.  Due to this, Walker threatened to de- 
part from Nicaragua and leave Castellon and the Democrats 
at the mercy of the Legitimists who were threatening an 
attack on Leon.  To maintain Walker's aid, Castellon nego- 
tiated a new agreement with Walker through Byron Cole, which 
I 
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ended the colonization grant. As a result of this new con- 
tract. Walker was authorized to enlist three hundred men 
for military service to the Republic of Nicaragua.  Nicaragua 
promised each recruit one hundred dollars a month and five 
hundred acres of land at the close of the campaign. 
Castellon gave Walker authority to settle all differences 
and outstanding accounts between the government and the 
Accessory Transit Company.12 After receiving this new con- 
tract. Walker was more eager than ever to secure control of 
the transit route.  Thus, on August 23, against the command 
of Castellon, who wished him to remain around Leon to pro- 
tect it. Walker sailed on his second campaign to the transit 
route.  By his disobedience. Walker began to show that he 
had more in mind than just helping Castellon and the 
Democrats.* 
The American Phalanx landed at San Juan del Sur on 
August 29 without any opposition from General Santos 
Guardiola, a Honduran, who was now in command of the Legiti- 
mist forces at Rivas.  After staying at San Juan del Sur 
*The idea expressed in this sentence that Walker had 
more in mind than helping castellon and the Democrats was 
expounded in a secondary source, William Walker: Filibuster, 
by Merritt Parmelee Allen.13 
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for a few days, the American Phalanx inarched to Virgin Bay 
on September 2.  Also on September 2, General Guardiola 
marched from Rivas toward San Juan del Sur to engage Walker 
in battle.  Upon learning that Walker had departed for 
Virgin Bay, Guardiola turned his army around and marched 
after the American Phalanx.  On the morning of September 3, 
Guardiola was ready for his assault on Walker's exposed 
position at Virgin Bay.  Walker, with 50 Americans and 120 
Nicaraguans under General Jose Maria Valle, superbly defended 
their position—repulsing Guardiola's assault which lasted 
for about two hours.  The Democrats undoubtedly fought more 
relentlessly than ever for two reasons:  (1) Guardiola had 
a reputation as the "Butcher," as he usually slaughtered 
his prisoners.14  It would certainly cause one to fight 
harder for one's life if he knew he could not surrender. 
(2) By having Lake Nicaragua at their backs, the soldiers 
had nowhere to retreat.  Being able neither to retreat nor 
to surrender, they had to fight and Guardiola suffered the 
consequences.  Other terrain features favored the Democrats. 
On the right was rising ground and on the left the level 
ground was interrupted by ditches and covered with fences— 
affording protection for the defenders (See map B). 
' 
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Guardiola's assault plan called for his troops to 
advance simultaneously from the wood line in three bodies— 
one body on each side of the road and the main body on the 
road.  The assault on the right was quickly and easily 
stopped by 20 American sharpshooters located on the rising 
ground.  General Valle repulsed the attack in the middle; 
but on the left, which was defended by Colonel Markham and 
fifteen hand-picked men, the Legitimists almost broke 
through.  Consequently, this was the scene of the most 
severe fighting.  Apparently, the Legitimists had been very 
sure of victory.  When captured enemy weapons were found, 
it was discovered that their bayonets had been greased 
for the butchery of the Democrats, and a quantity of torches 
were found with which they would have set fire to the build- 
ings of the Accessory Transit company.15 
The outnumbered Democrats successfully defended 
Virgin Bay.  Peter Stout, a vice-consul of the United States 
to Nicaragua in the 1850's, quite succinctly describes the 
battlefield a few hours later. 
The foe was routed, and the moon rose upon 
a battlefield far bloodier than those fought be- 
tween the Serviles and Liberals heretofore, while 
she lighted to the distant shelter a broken and 
dispirited bank of harassed and wounded soldiers. 
Thus, was fought the first regular battle 16 
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While  the Americans   lost  no  one  to enemy  fire,   they killed 
60 of  the  540-man Legitimist  force.1'     According  to Wells, 
the  reason  for  such  success   is  that   "American rifles,  with 
American eyes  to give  them direction and steady American 
hands  to pull  the  triggers,   are  terrible weapons."18    Al- 
though there may be  some  credibility to this  statement,   in 
the  opinion of  this  writer  the basic  reason  for  their 
success was  that  they had  to fight.     They had nowhere to 
retreat  and  could not  surrender. 
By defeating  this  Legitimist   force,   William Walker 
now  had gained  control  of  the  transit route.     This  placed 
him  in contact with the  outside world and enabled  him to 
receive  supplies  and  recruits. 
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CHAPTER IV 
WALKER UNITES THE WARRING FACTIONS 
William Walker's next step was to unite the two 
parties and establish a single party.  This would be ex- 
tremely difficult, as the Legitimist and Democratic par- 
ties had seemingly irreconcilable differences.  But in 
order for Nicaragua to be a stable and prosperous nation 
and for Walker to use Nicaragua as a springboard for his 
empire, it was of the utmost importance that these Legiti- 
mists and Democrats be united.  Walker revealed his plan of 
empire building—that of uniting all the Central American 
states and eventually Mexico under his control—to Doubleday. 
As Doubleday was sincerely interested in bringing democracy 
to Nicaragua, he became disillusioned with Walker and soon 
left.1 Although Walker needed Doubleday's combat experience 
and knowledge of the country, losing one idealistic young 
man was not to deter him from his goal. 
Having returned to San Juan del Sur shortly after his 
victory at Virgin Bay, Walker set up headquarters there for 
La Democracia—the Democratic Party.  By October, 1855, 
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Walker's men secured control of the Accessory Transit 
Company's lake steamer. La virgen.  That evening, the 
American Phalanx boarded La virgen and stealthily steamed 
up the coast to Granada. Around midnight and approximately 
three miles north of Granada, the American Phalanx and the 
Nicaraguan troops under Valle slipped ashore.  Hardly firing 
a shot, the American Phalanx simply walked into Granada. 
A New York Daily Times dispatch describes the early morning 
action— 
At last the order was given to advance in 
double quick time, which was done with a cheer; 
at length the old western whoop was given, which 
must have aroused many a slothful guardian from 
his couch, and the whole force advanced on a 
barricade in one of the streets and gained the 
Plaza without any resistance. 
With this simple but masterful stroke, Granada belonged to 
William Walker.  (See map C). 
About the only shots fired were by Lieutenant Colonel 
Gilman and twenty-five Americans under his command who were 
detached to secure a fort about a mile east of the city. 
After firing only one volley, the forty defenders of the 
fort jumped into their boats and paddled away.  Quite un- 
believably. Walker's coup succeeded without loss of life 
or ammunition because, in attempting to mass all troops in 
Rivas, the Legitimist army had left Granada practically 
. 
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undefended.  Walker now realized that with Granada in his 
grasp, it was only a matter of time until the Legitimist 
army folded and all of Nicaragua would be under his domi- 
nation—either directly or indirectly. 
It might be suggested that Walker took a tremendous 
gamble in leaving the transit route, which was his lifeline, 
unguarded, but Walker knew that the key to stability in 
Nicaragua was control of the capital city, Granada.  There 
is an excellent possibility that if the Legitimist commander- 
in-chief had not left Granada undefended. Walker might not 
have taken Granada.  He definitely would not have taken it 
so easily.  But it is most remarkable that Walker and the 
American Phalanx, now totaling approximately eighty-five 
men, could bring Nicaragua under their domination in approxi- 
mately four months. 
With Granada in Walker's grasp and complete domi- 
nation seemingly only a matter of time away, there occurred 
one of the most amusing events of this entire curious little 
war.  A few days after the battle of Granada, two American 
filibusters, Birkett D. Fry and Parker H. French, arrived 
at Virgin Bay with additional recruits and wanted to par- 
ticipate in the action while it lasted.  Fry and French 
plotted to capture Fort San Carlos from the Legitimists 
' 
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(See map C) .  They commandeered the lake steamer, Lja virgen, 
during one of its regular runs between Virgin Bay and Fort 
San Carlos.  They neglected, however, to allow the passen- 
gers on board to disembark.  The male passengers were in- 
vited to take arms and join the fight or go below with the 
women, as they chose.  One passenger later recounted in 
verse: 
Of passengers, but few were now averse 
A fight to join, but willing to emerce 
A recompense for jeopardy in strife. 
By mulct assessed in currency of life. 
Yet, some there were, of apprehensive mind. 
Who murmered low, to fate but ill resigned. 
One cautious man, when urged to join the scheme. 
With timid face lit up in hopeful gleam. 
In anxious tone proceeded to inquire: 
"Will they shoot back when we begin to fire?" 
"0, certainly!  They'll pay us back our coin." 
"Ah!  well," he gravely said, "Then I shan't join." 
So ludicrous, the colloquy thus held. 
All rueful thought was instantly dispelled. 
Loud peaks of laughter broke from all around. 
And left each mind an echo of their sound. 
The captain of the steamer and two men were sent ashore to 
request the surrender of the fort, but they were seized and 
made prisoners.  Subsequently, La Virgen was fired upon by 
twelve-pound shot from the fort but was not damaged.  Then 
Captain Turnbull, who had arrived with Fry and French, and 
other American riflemen decided to go ashore and attempt the 
capture of the fort.  However, while they were rowing to 
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shore, a rainstorm soaked their ammunition.  They decided 
to forsake their mission, and La Virgen returned to Virgin 
Bay. 
An hour later, the steamer San Carlos, enroute up 
river from below the fort to Virgin Bay, was accidentally 
fired upon by the fort, and a lady and one child were killed." 
The Legitimists had believed the steamer San Carlos to be 
the La virgen.  They also retaliated with a raid on the 
property of the Accessory Transit Company at virgin Bay on 
October 19, 1856.  This relatively minor action was soon 
blown out of proportion and called a massacre.  This was a 
propitious event for Walker, for he had needed something to 
force the Legitimists to the bargaining table.  Thus, not 
only to retaliate for the San Carlos incident and the 
massacre at Virgin Bay, but also to exert pressure on the 
Legitimist forces. Walker ordered that Mateo Mayorga be 
recaptured and executed.  Mayorga, a prominent Legitimist 
and Minister of Relations in the Legitimist government, had 
been caught at the capture of Granada, but had been sub- 
sequently released to illustrate Walker's good intentions 
and to show he had no grievance or ill will toward the 
Legitimists.  But due to these incidents and Mayorga'■ high 
position in the Legitimist government. Walker decided that 
38 
by having him recaptured and executed, he would accomplish 
his objective, forcing Ponciano Corral, the commander-in- 
chief of the Legitimist forces, to negotiate with him.6 
Along with Mayorga's execution on October 22, the word was 
sent out that if there were any more incidents such as the 
massacre at Virgin Bay, then members of other Legitimist 
families in Granada would be subsequently executed.  This 
forced Corral to come to the bargaining table and make 
amends with Walker. Although this provided the spark for 
the eventual peace treaty, the execution of Mayorga was the 
beginning of a series of mistakes which would eventually 
topple Walker from power.  As a short range objective, it 
served its purpose, but as a long range objective, it was 
disastrous. 
In the meantime, John H. Wheeler, United States Min- 
ister to Nicaragua, became involved in trying to secure 
peace between Walker and Corral.  However, when Wheeler 
reached Rivas he was unable to speak with Corral as he was 
immediately incarcerated.  In an attempt to secure Wheeler's 
release. Walker ordered the steamer. La Virgen, to proceed 
to San Jorge, the point nearest Rivas, and to fire four 
warning shots from the cannon.  The Legitimists who held 
Wheeler were at first alarmed, but then hesitated at 
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releasing him.  Upon realizing this. Wheeler told the 
general in charge, Pedro Xatruch (a Honduran aiding the 
Legitimists), "that if he stopped me any longer that the 
steamer had my friends on board and a thousand men would 
come and not a man would be spared."  Wheeler was quickly 
released and soon returned to Granada.7 
On October 23, General Corral, Commander of the 
Legitimist forces, and Walker signed a peace treaty termi- 
nating hostilities between the Legitimists and Democrats. 
The treaty opened with this statement: 
Generals William Walker and Ponciano Corral, 
being animated with the most sincere desire to put 
an end to the war which has destroyed Nicaragua, 
and anxious to remedy so great an evil, the first 
in virtue of the faculties given him, and the 
second fully empowered by the Government which 
resided in this city, have agreed, after mature 
discussion, in celebrating the following treaty. 
The first article, probably the most important, stated: 
"From this day are suspended hostilities, and there shall be 
peace and frienship between the belligerent armies."8 
It was agreed that on October 29, both the Legitimist 
and Democratic forces would assemble in the central Plaza 
of Granada.  On October 30, the officers of the new Pro- 
visional Government would take their oaths of office. 
Patricio Rivas, named as President of the Provisional 
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Government   for the  specified time of  fourteen months,  was 
selected because,   although he was  from Granada,   he was known 
for  his  middle-of-the-road views.    William Walker was  se- 
lected  as  the  commander-in-chief of the armed  forces. 
General Maximo Jerez was  selected as  the Minister  of 
Relations.     General  Ponciano Corral was  selected as  the 
Minister of War.     Colonel  Parker H.  French was   chosen as 
the Minister  of the  Hacienda   (Treasury)   and Fermin Ferrer 
Q 
was chosen as the Minister of Public Credit. 
After the new officers took their oaths in the 
Cathedral, Padre Augustin Vijil,* the curate of Granada, 
delivered an emotional plea which was very complimentary 
to Walker for uniting the warring factions in Nicaragua. 
I have preached peace, liberty and 
progression to you, and you have cried more 
blood.  Look at that man. General Walker, 
sent by Providence to bring peace, prosperity 
and happiness to this blood-stained, unhappy 
country.  We all owe him and his brave men 
many thanks.  I charge you to keep this peace, 
which promises so much for our country, for 
us, for all, etc., etc. 
From the beginning it seemed that foreboding over- 
shadowed the new government and Walker's role in it. 
•. 
*walker later appointed Padre Vijil to become the 
Minister to the United States. 
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Although it was definitely necessary to impose penalties on 
individuals for crimes so as to maintain discipline, it 
seemed Walker enjoyed imposing harsh penalties, especially 
executions.  This attitude made many enemies for Walker. 
Although the first execution, that of Mateo Mayorga 
on October 22, occurred before the installation of the new 
Provisional Government, it still cost Walker many friends, 
as he was responsible for the execution. 
The second incident involved one of his own soldiers. 
On the night of November 2, Patrick Jordan, having become 
highly intoxicated, accidentally killed a Nicaraguan boy. 
Walker immediately ordered his execution, and despite pleas 
from American officers, the boy's mother, and Padre Vijil 
for mercy, the execution was carried out. 
A third execution occurred only a few days later. 
Despite General Corral's promises to honor the new govern- 
ment, treasonable letters written by him were intercepted 
by General Valle and subsequently turned over to Walker. 
On November 5, Corral was arrested and charges and speci- 
fications for treason were prepared against him—"forasmuch 
as he had invited Generals Guardiola and Xatruch to come 
and with armed violence disturb the peace of Nicaragua, and 
for conspiring with the enemies of the State to overthrow 
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the Government of Nicaragua; forasmuch as he had held 
i 
treasonable correspondence with General Martinez and 
Xatruch."11 A court martial board composed of American 
officers convened on November 7 and convicted him of treason, 
which carried the death penalty, but the board recommended 
mercy.  Walker, however, did not honor the court martial's 
recommendation, and on November 8, Ponciano Corral, the 
Minister of Relations of the new Provisional Government, 
was executed by a firing squad.12 
Walker's reason for not allowing leniency was that 
it would have showed weakness on the part of the new govern- 
ment and would have encouraged more treasonable acts. 
Whether this reasoning was right or wrong, the effect of 
the execution was to create a martyr of Corral, and thus to 
reopen old wounds which had just so recently been healed. 
walker had again executed for effect.  He had achieved 
some short-term value, but as a long-run objective Corral's 
execution was dubious at most.  Stout, who was very pro- 
Walker, even shows concern for Walker's action in Corral's 
execution:  "The entire country was shocked upon learning 
of his condemnation and death, and even the friends and 
supporters of the Cause felt that the stroke had been too 
hasty and severe, and for a time it is said that even Walker 
I 
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himself shared  the  same  opinions.     But  to succeed,   treachery 
must be  summarily punished."13     The  execution might have 
been erased  from Walker's mind,   but  citizens  of  a  country 
do not  soon  forget  the  execution of one  of  their  leaders. 
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CHAPTER V 
WAR WITH COSTA RICA—BATTLE OF SANTA ROSA 
AND THE SECOND BATTLE OF RIVAS 
The other Central American nations did not like the 
idea of Nicaragua's being for all practical purposes con- 
trolled by an American filibuster and an American army. 
They realized that it would probably be only a matter of 
time before Walker would attempt to annex them.  They also 
realized the possibility that if Walker were successful in 
Nicaragua, it would encourage other American filibusters 
to covet his success and to infiltrate their countries. 
It was, therefore, vital to the other Central American 
nations that Walker be destroyed for national security. 
These Central American nations were encouraged and 
given confidence by the fact that the United States had 
failed to give diplomatic recognition to the Rivas Govern- 
ment, which was dominated by Walker.  They therefore assumed 
that if they took belligerent action against the Rivas-Walker 
Government, that the United States would not intervene.  A 
curious fact arises in reference to United States recog- 
nition of the Rivas-Walker Government.  On November 10, 1855, 
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John H. Wheeler, United States Minister to Nicaragua, ex- 
tended diplomatic recognition to the Rivas-Walker Govern- 
ment.  However, on December 21, 1855, when Parker French 
arrived in the United States to take up his post as Min- 
ister to the United States, United States Secretary of 
State Marcy refused to recognize him on the grounds that 
the people of Nicaragua themselves had not acknowledged the 
new government.1 As a result of this refusal by the United 
States to recognize Parker French, Central American nations 
were practically assured that the United States would not 
intervene in a war involving the Central American nations 
and the Rivas-Walker Government. 
Walker had made a tremendous mistake in his selection 
of Parker French to become Minister to the one country he 
should have cultivated with all possible care.  Parker 
French, before going to Nicaragua, had been involved in 
several scandals in the United States.  In one, he had de- 
frauded the United States Army in Texas of thousands of 
dollars.  These facts were soon discovered and published, 
and probably constituted a great factor in Secretary of 
State Marcy's refusal to recognize French.  Had Walker 
taken the time and interest to send a more reputable indi- 
vidual to the United States, recognition might have been 
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extended and might have made the Central American nations, 
especially Costa Rica, think twice about declaring war on 
Nicaragua. 
Credit must be given to Walker for at least trying to 
preserve the new-found peace in Nicaragua.  The Rivas-Walker 
Government sent letters and emissaries to other Central 
American nations stating that a compromise government had 
been established and requesting diplomatic recognition. 
Walker sent Colonel Louis Schlessinger, another filibuster 
recruited in the United States, to Costa Rica in an attempt 
to placate his most vociferous enemy.  Schlessinger was 
treated with contempt and rudeness by the Costa Rican Govern- 
ment and sent quickly back to Nicaragua.  Walker probably 
made a mistake in sending Schlessinger to Costa Rica. 
Schlessinger later proved to be a very poor military command- 
er and had, in fact, misrepresented himself to Walker.  In 
actuality, he was only a corporal, not a colonel, in the 
Austrian army and probably did not have the ability to be 
a successful diplomat. 
On February 27, 1856, President Juan Rafael Mora 
called a special session of the Costa Rican Congress.  By 
authority of this congress, he was to take up arms against 
the Republic of Nicaragua, to call for 9.000 volunteers to 
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defend the Costa Rican people from the filibusters, and to 
expel the invaders from Central American soil.2 On March 1, 
President Mora declared war against the Americans in the 
service of Nicaragua, but not against the government of 
the Republic of Nicaragua.3  Consequently, the Rivas-Walker 
Government declared war on Costa Rica, and Walker issued 
the following statement:  "We have sent them the olive 
branch; they have sent us back the knife.  Be it so.  We 
shall give them war to the knife, and knife to the hilt."4 
By this time Walker's American Phalanx had increased 
to approximately 600 men.  Walker instructed Colonel 
Schlessinger with 250 men to strike the first blow of the 
war by marching into the disputed territory of the Depart- 
ment of Guanacaste.  By accomplishing this, the American 
Phalanx would have a strong outpost at some distance south 
of the transit route to guard against any surprise attack 
by the Costa Ricans upon the transit route.  Also, these 
troops under Schlessinger would act as the "eyes and ears" 
of Walker's army and provide him with quick and reliable 
information.  To guard against attack on the highly important 
San Juan River, troops were dispatched to occupy and hold 
Castillo Viejo and Hipp's Point.5 
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Colonel Schlessinger marched his battalion from 
Virgin Bay to San Juan del Sur on March 13 and continued 
the march south the following day.  An ominous cloud 
shadowed Schlessinger's command from the beginning.  Most 
importantly, his battalion was composed almost entirely of 
raw recruits, and with the exception of the Americans, the 
five companies of forty men consisted of three nationalities, 
having no common language.  A French company was commanded 
by Captain Legaye, a German company by Captain Prange, a 
New Orleans company under Captain D. W. Thorpe, a New York 
unit under Captain Creighton, and a California company 
under Captain Antony F. Rudler.6 This battalion was hastily 
put together with no time to drill together or even really 
to become acquainted until they began their march.  Combining 
units of such diversity was bound to create friction.  To 
command such a unit would have required a tremendous indi- 
vidual with a great deal of tact, courage, military knowledge, 
and an ability to communicate with the French and German 
units.  Schlessinger fitted the bill only on one account- 
he spoke German and French.  Schlessinger apparently neither 
cared for nor tried to improve his command.  Certainly no 
commander would ever begin a combat mission without having 
an inspection of arms, yet Schlessinger never did conduct 
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an inspection from the time he left Virgin Bay until his 
defeat at Santa Rosa.  However, what really astounds one 
is that "many were without so much as a screw to draw the 
charge; and some of the foreigners were so ignorant of the 
use of the arms, that they did not know which end of the 
cartridge to bite off in order to load."7 On his line of 
march, Schlessinger continued to show his incompetence, as 
"no pickets were kept out, nor patrols sent in advance to 
watch the movements of the enemy, which was known to be 
advancing in heavy force."  Then Schlessinger, at the point 
where he could at any moment of the day expect an enemy 
attack, sent his only surgeon as the bearer of dispatches 
to Granada.8 Surely no commander should be guilty of such 
gross negligence. 
On the night of March 19, he occupied the hacienda 
of Santa Rosa about 8 miles from his first objective, the 
town of Guanacaste.  Santa Rosa was an excellent defensive 
position and Schlessinger should have been able to withstand 
numerous assaults (See map D).  "The hacienda was a spacious 
and strongly built old Spanish house, situated on a rise of 
about ten feet from the road and surrounded on three sides 
by a strong stone wall of solid mason work (some 4 or 5 feet 
high). and which being fitted in with earth, formed an even 
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platform on which the house was set."  This provided the 
hacienda, itself, with a commanding view of the area and 
would provide excellent fields of fire.  On the rear of the 
hacienda, the extension of the platform was not needed as 
the platform ran into the mountain side, "which rose gradu- 
ally for 300 or 400 yards, then shot abruptly upwards to a 
great height.  From the rear, therefore, the house could 
not be attacked at all."  Across the road from the hacienda 
was a long stone corral divided by a partition wall which, 
by itself, should have been able to withstand assault.  In 
addition to these fortifications, there was an abundance of 
corn and of sacate, for the animals.9 However, even with 
all these advantages, an advance guard of approximately 500 
men attacked Schlessinger's command, and within five minutes 
his command was completely routed. 
As indicated on diagram—(See illustration 3),10 the 
Santa Rosa hacienda was attacked on the right by a small 
body of Costa Ricans under Captain Gutierrez, while the 
main body, commanded by General Mariano Salazer, came from 
the plain in front.  At the sound of the first rifle fire, 
Schlessinger immediately fled from the hacienda, not even 
waiting to give any orders or directions.  The raw recruits, 
seeing their commander fleeing, naturally fled also.  Only 
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the New York company under Captain Creighton fired a volley 
during the entire action. 
Costa Rican President Juan Rafael Mora describes the 
battle of Santa Rosa in a letter later reprinted in the New 
York Daily Times. 
...you will be made acquainted with the 
details of the battle fought by General Don Juan 
Joaquin Mora with the Filibuster, yesterday, at 
4 1/2 o'clock in the afternoon, at the Hacienda 
of Santa Rosa, where, not withstanding that three 
to four hundred of the greatest assassins in the 
bandit Walker's band had fortified themselves be- 
hind the stone walls of the farm-yard, our men 
were not deterred from attacking them, and, after 
one volley, charging them with the bayonet.  The 
struggle was fearful and lasted for fifteen minutes, 
after which those who were not killed were forced 
to fly and escape, one by one.11 
For some unexplainable reason, the Costa Ricans did 
not pursue the disorganized and retreating American troops, 
and, therefore, missed a golden opportunity to destroy an 
entire command.  The American troops that did escape re- 
turned to Virgin Bay as individuals or squads, not as com- 
panies.  Probably the most beneficial result of the engagement 
for the American Phalanx was that all troops who could not 
speak English were discharged. 
As a result of his actions, Schlessinger was court- 
martialed. Charges were neglect of duty, ignorance of his 
duties as a commanding officer, cowardice in the face of 
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the enemy, and later, desertion.  Schlessinger was found 
guilty of all charges and sentenced to be executed by a 
firing squad.  He missed his execution, however, because he 
escaped while on honor parole during the trial.  Thus, the 
order was sent out that Schlessinger could be shot on sight 
in Nicaragua.13 
Receiving word of Schlessinger's defeat. Walker 
immediately moved the majority of the American Phalanx from 
Granada to Rivas in order to be able better to defend the 
transit route from the invading Costa Rican army.  President 
Mora, upon learning of Walker's concentration of forces at 
Rivas, held up his advance at Pena Blanca on the southern 
boundary line of the Meridional Department (borderline of 
Costa Rica and Nicaragua).  Having waited in vain for Mora's 
advance from March 30 to April 5, Walker, upon receiving 
news that threatened the security of northern Nicaragua, 
decided to return to Granada.  He did leave a small detach- 
ment of Nicaraguan troops under Colonel Jose Machado to 
observe the movements of the Costa Rican troops.14 
It was a colossal blunder on Walker's part to leave 
the transit route unguarded and to return to Granada since 
the transit route was so vital to his security, and 4,000 
Costa Rican troops were waiting only a few miles away to 
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fill the vacuum should he depart.  With Walker's departure, 
Mora immediately occupied Rivas and Virgin Bay on April 7. 
Walker, upon learning of the capture of Rivas, immediately 
made preparations to return to Rivas.  On April 9, the 
American Phalanx of 400 American and 100 Nicaraguan troops 
under Colonel Machado departed for Rivas.  At approximately 
three o'clock in the morning of April 11, the forces of 
William Walker were ready for their assault upon Rivas 
(See map E) . 
Walker's plan of attack was quickly to seize the 
central plaza and President Mora.  Lieutenant Colonel Edward 
Sanders, with four companies of the First Rifles, was to 
enter by the streets north of the plaza and try to reach 
the house where President Mora was quartered about 80 yards 
from the main Plaza.  Major A. S. Brewster, with three 
companies of the First Rifles, was to enter by way of the 
south side of the Plaza and also try to reach Mora. 
Colonel Bruno von Natzmer and Major O'Neal with the Second 
Rifles were to enter on the extreme left of the city. 
Colonel Machado, with his 100 Nicaraguan troops, was to move 
on Lieutenant Colonel Sanders' right.  Colonel Fry was to 
hold his companies of Light Infantry as reserve.*5  (See 
illustration 4).16 
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Colonel Sanders' and Major Brewster's forces sur- 
prised the Costa Rican troops and quickly secured control 
of the Plaza but were unable to capture Mora.  When Sanders 
troops took a few minutes to secure two cannons, it gave 
the Costa Ricans enough time to regroup in houses in the 
western part of the town and to stop any further advance. 
The assault had every promise of success, as the attacks 
were made simultaneously, but the Americans became bogged 
down in the Plaza.  Both the Americans and Costa Ricans 
made numerous charges and countercharges during the day, 
but each was repulsed by the opposing side.  The only way 
to reach the Costa Ricans would have been to bore or blast 
through the walls of the adjoining adobe buildings, but 
at that time the American Phalanx had no sappers or miners 
with which to accomplish this purpose. Attacking troops 
have to take advantage of every type of material or forti- 
fication available, and the Americans in Nicaragua found an 
unusual material. 
Fortunately, in a large building near the 
corner of the plaza, was found stored many tons of 
Spanish queso (cheese) in huge blocks, of granite- 
like hardness and imperious to bullets.  Temporary 
breastworks were quickly made of these mammoth cheeses, 
behind which was placed a body of sharpshooters. 
That these breastworks of cheeses were far from 
quixotic was further shown by the fact tl while 
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our  sharpshooters were  not making  targets  of 
Costa Rican heads,   they were  satisfying  their 
hunger by digging  into  the  heart of  the bar- 
ricade with  their  jack-knives. 
Walker's   situation was  precarious  as  the  troops were 
running  low  on ammunition,   so a general  retreat was  ordered. 
Stout quite  aptly describes  the action  at Rivas  and  in spite 
of  their  defeat,   points  to  the  courage and the  fierceness 
of the American  Phalanx.      "Street by street was   fought 
through,  barricades were  overthrown,   houses   fired and  sacked, 
carnage  reigned supreme,   and the best and bravest of Walker's 
army fell  dead on that  eventful  day "     Stout,   in very 
picturesque  language,   describes  the  charge of the  filibusters, 
"but  the  cool,   undaunted Americans,  who advanced to  the 
thundering  cannon,   while  yet  the  smoke kissed  its warm  lip, 
this  to  the  foe was beyond  all  conception."1       By midnight, 
the American Phalanx was  on the  road  to Granada. 
At Rivas,   Walker again pointedly  illustrated his 
failure  as  a military  tactican.     Not  only did he  abandon 
Rivas without  a valid reason  to do so,   but  he then returned 
a  few days   later with only  500 troops  to attack  the  same 
place he  had abandoned earlier.     As  already pointed  out, 
Rivas   is  practically an  impregnable  fortress   if  properly 
defended.     It  could have  been held by a  small number of 
Americans  who  could have   inflicted heavy casualties  on Mora's 
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forces or prevented Mora from advancing to the transit 
route. Walker was no tactican, but President Mora, his 
brother General Juan Joaquin Mora, General Jose Maria 
Canas, and the Prussian officer Baron Alejandro Bulow were 
no better, as they won the battle but lost the war. 
They did not pursue the wounded soldiers and lost 
another opportunity to destroy much of the American Phalanx. 
But the greatest catastrophe occurred as the Costa Ricans 
violated one of the oldest sanitary rules in the world. 
Instead of burying their dead, they threw the corpses into 
the drinking wells.  Within only a few days, cholera had 
broken out and was wreaking havoc among the Costa Rican 
army.  On April 29, General Canas ordered a general with- 
drawal from this strategic city near the transit route be- 
cause the Costa Ricans had violated the most elementary 
health rules.  By the time the Costa Rican army reached San 
Jose', the capital of Costa Rica, the army which had crossed 
into Nicaragua had been decimated by cholera from approxi- 
mately 4,000 men to 500.19 William Walker was again able 
to maintain his grasp on Nicaragua due to failures in the 
Costa Rican high command. 
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CHAPTER VI 
"AQUI FUE GRANADA"—"HERE WAS GRANADA" 
On June 10, Walker had dissolved the government 
headed by Rivas and replaced him with Fermin Ferrer.  Walker 
officially declared his action in the following decree: 
With such accumulated crimes—conspiring 
against the very people it was bound to protect— 
the late provisional government was no longer 
worthy of existence.  In the name of the people 
I have, therefore, declared its dissolution and 
have organized a provisional government until 
the nation exercises its natural right of 
electing its own rulers.1 
Subsequently, on June 29, 1856, Walker was elected president, 
having received the highest number of votes cast: 
Walker 
Ferrer 
Rivas 
Salazar 
15,835 
4,447 
867 
2,087"' 
The next scenario of perennial warfare began with 
the signing of a treaty of alliance on July 18, 1856, be- 
tween the governments of Honduras, Guatemala, and El Salvador, 
These nations promised mutual defense of their sovereignty 
and independence, recognized Rivas as the provisional presi- 
dent of Nicaragua, and promised Rivas their aid with troops 
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to drive out William Walker.3 This occurred as William 
Walker reached the pinnacle of power in Nicaragua. 
Even though Walker was now officially president of 
Nicaragua, ex-Provisional President Rivas still controlled 
Leon and Chinandega.  Walker's American Phalanx still held 
the stragegic positions in Nicaragua and should have been 
capable of stopping or deterring for a considerable time 
any allied advance, especially from the north.  The American 
Phalanx held the strongly fortified city of Masaya with 
approximately 400 men under the command of Lieutenant 
Colonel James Mclntosh; Walker's cavalry, of approximately 
200 men, the Rangers, under the command of Major John Waters 
occupied Managua, the point most advanced toward the enemy. 
The bulk of the American Phalanx was stationed at Granada. 
As has already been indicated, most Latin American cities 
were built around a central Plaza with roads radiating from 
the Plaza, lined with interlocking adobe buildings.  Masaya 
and Managua were no exception to this rule, and they should 
have offered stiff resistance to any advancing army. 
General Ramon Belloso of El Salvador was the commander 
of the Allied Army. (At present the Allied Army was composed 
of the governments of Honduras, Guatemala, El Salvador. 
: 
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and  the Rivas   faction  in Nicaragua).     General Belloso began 
his march on Walker  from his  headquarters  at Leon with 
approximately  2,300 men on September  18,   1856.     As  Belloso 
approached Managua,   Walker  ordered Major Waters  to abandon 
his  positions  there.     Thus,  Belloso entered Managua un- 
resisted  on September  24.     Belloso for  some unexplainable 
reason  delayed  in Managua  for a week.     But again,   as 
Belloso  advanced  on Masaya,   the  last American defensive 
position before Granada,  Walker unbelievably ordered 
Lieutenant  Colonel Mclntosh with some 400 men to abandon 
their strong  defensive  position without a  contest.     This 
certainly seems  strange  in  the  light of two  important 
aspects.     First,  Masaya was known as the granary of 
Nicaragua,   and to wage a  successful  conflict  or  control  a 
nation,   the  nation's breadbasket must be  controlled. 
Secondly,   "Masaya was   located high on a promontory and 
accessible only by tortuous mountain roads...Almost any 
body of efficient  soldiers  could have held the city  indefi- 
nitely against  any army attempting to reach it  from below.-4 
(See map F) . 
Apparently,  Walker wanted to concentrate  all his 
forces  at Granada  and make Belloso challenge him there. 
However, if this was his reasoning, he changed his mind, and 
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on October  11,  with approximately 800 men,   he advanced  from 
Granada with the objective  of recapturing Masaya.    Walker's 
battle plan was  similar to the battle plan  for Rivas,   and 
the results were the  same. 
On October  12,  Walker's  attack on Masaya was 
initiated.     The  Plaza was  gained,   but the Allies withdrew 
to  the houses behind the  Plaza and continued to  fight 
tenaciously.     Walker  can be pardoned partially for not 
having successfully taken Masaya,   because on the night of 
October  12,   a message  reached  him  informing him that ele- 
ments  of  the Allied Army had  left Masaya earlier and were 
attacking Granada.     Granada was  held by approximately 200 
men under General Fry while  its  attackers under the command 
of General  Jose Victor Zavala   (commander of the Guatemalan 
forces)   and Jose' Maria Estrada   (commander of the Legitimist 
forces  and  inheritor  of the presidential claim from 
Chamorro)   commanded approximately  700 men. 
In  spite of appearances,  Zavala and Estrada were not 
part of  a  grand strategy to entrap Walker  and cut him off 
from his base of supplies.    They had simply deserted Belloso 
and Masaya  and decided to attack Granada when they learned 
Walker was  enroute to Masaya.     Thus,  by jealousy and luck. 
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not  military brilliance,   the Allies  almost snared Walker, 
immediately upon  learning of  this  situation.  Walker ordered 
the evacuation  of  the  attack positions  at Masaya and returned 
to Granada  at  full  speed. 
On the morning of October  13,   the First  Rifles 
commanded by Colonel Markham of the American Phalanx quickly 
engaged and dispersed  the  forces  of Zavala and Estrada on 
the edge of Granada.     Thereby Granada and the American 
Phalanx were  saved  for  a  short time.       Ironically,   the 
American  Phalanx drove  the  enemy from Granada on October  13, 
exactly one  year  after  their  capture  of Granada  from the 
Legitimists. 
Soon after  the battle of Granada,   Charles  Frederick 
Henningsen,  Walker's  most  renowned soldier,   arrived  in 
Nicaragua  to offer  his  services  to the American Phalanx 
(See illustration 5) .6    Henningsen had been devoted to the 
military,   having  seen service  in Spain,   Hungary and Russia. 
He had won great renown  for his  part  on the side of the 
rebellious  Carlists   in Spain and with the revolutionists 
in Russia  and Hungary.7     He had written numerous books  on 
military tactics  and  campaigns,   and was  an expert on 
artillery and  the Minie Rifle.     Henningsen's  offer of 
service was  quickly accepted,   and he was  promoted to the 
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rank of major general.  From this point on, Henningsen was 
very instrumental in the conduct of Walker's campaign. 
On November 1, 1856, President Mora of Costa Rica 
declared war on the Walker regime in Nicaragua, thus com- 
pleting the encirclement of Walker's Nicaragua by the Allied 
forces.  On November 7, General canas occupied San Juan del 
Sur, which was not garrisoned by the American Phalanx.  In 
fact, the only American force in the entire district around 
San Juan del Sur was the "navy," which consisted of only 
one small sloop, commanded by Captain Callender Irvine 
Fayssoux.8 
Walker then decided to try to strike both the Allied 
armies at San Juan del Sur and at Masaya before they could 
effect a link-up.  Walker had to attack the Costa Rican army 
at San Juan del Sur in order to keep open his lifeline, the 
transit route.  On November 11, Walker proceeded to Virgin 
Bay with approximately 250 men.  On November 12, the 
American Phalanx met and completely routed the Costa Rican 
army of approximately 800 men under General Canas. 
Canas' army was entrenched on a hill on the transit 
route near San Juan del Sur. When Colonel Natzmer's men 
assaulted canas' position on the right, the Costa Rican 
forces began an orderly retreat.  Under the leadership of 
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General Henningsen, the Rangers relentlessly pursued 
Canas' troops and, in effect, completely scattered his 
command.   The next day (November 13), the American 
Phalanx returned to Granada and one day later (November 14) , 
Walker and approximately 250 men marched on Masaya.  For 
three days (November 15-17), Walker's men fought desperately 
for the control of Masaya.  But again, as at Rivas and 
Masaya earlier, the American Phalanx was able to penetrate 
only a short distance into the city.  Finally, around mid- 
night on November 17 Walker called off the attack and 
returned to Granada on November 18.10 Once more, the Allied 
Army failed to pursue a physically exhausted band of men 
and missed another opportunity completely to shatter Walker's 
army (See map G) . 
On his return to Granada on November 18, Walker 
decided that Granada not only had to be abandoned but it 
had to be destroyed.  Surely what followed at Granada from 
November 19 to December 14 not only constituted one of the 
most remarkable aspects of the whole Filibuster War, but 
also was the worst example of destructiveness during the 
Filibuster War.  Walker ordered Granada's destruction be- 
cause of its symbolic importance. 
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To destroy Granada would strike terror into the 
hearts of the Allies and it would insure "a salutory dread 
of American justice among the plotting Legitimists. "H 
Furthermore, to leave Granada intact would give the Allies 
a strong fortress.  It was anticipated that the razing of 
Granada would take only a few days and that General Henning- 
sen, who had been assigned this mission, could effect the 
destruction and his escape before the Allies attacked. 
Henningsen's men, however, could not control their thirst 
for drinking and looting when they were informed of their 
mission.  Instead of beginning immediately to burn and 
destroy the city, they satiated themselves with liquor and 
loot.  Not until November 23 did actual destruction begin, 
and by then it was too late to accomplish the mission with- 
out a fight. 
The Allied forces under General Belloso had not 
attacked earlier because of bickering among the high command. 
By November 23, General Belloso had settled the disputes 
among the Allied forces, and around three o'clock on the 
afternoon of November 24 Belloso's forces simultaneously 
attacked Granada on three sides.  One Allied force struck 
the northern suburb of Jalteva, but was repulsed by 
Henningsen-s most able aide. Major Swingle. Another force 
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had as its objective the Church of San Francisco, but it 
was repulsed.  The third force accomplished its objective 
of capturing the Guadalupe Cathedral, thus effectively 
sealing off any escape route to Lake Nicaragua as the 
Guadalupe Cathedral overlooked the street running from the 
lake to the main Plaza. 
Henningsen, realizing that his only hope of effecting 
an escape was to reach Lake Nicaragua where Walker was 
waiting for him aboard La Virgen, began a tortuous journey 
in that direction.  From house to house, day by day, until 
December 13, Henningsen's command fought their way toward 
the lake.  They were faced not only by a hostile army but 
also by disease and near starvation.  Only a man of 
indomitable courage could have accomplished such a feat. 
Henningsen's troops were able to blow up the Church of San 
Francisco which they had successfully defended in the first 
assault, and to recapture the Esquipulas Church and the 
Guadalupe Cathedral.  From the Guadalupe Cathedral, they 
slowly built breastworks toward Lake Nicaragua.  Their 
escape, however, was effected only by Colonel Waters with 
a relief force which successfully stormed three earthen 
breastworks and led what remained of Henningsen's force to 
the wharf where they were evacuated onto the steamer La Virgen. 
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Of the 419 men,   women,   and  children that  Henningsen 
was   leading  from Granada on November 24,   only 227 were 
capable of bearing  arms.     By December  14,   the total of 419 
men had been drastically reduced because   110 had either 
been killed or wounded,   40 had deserted,   and  two had been 
captured.     Before boarding the  steamer,   Henningsen  implanted 
in the  soil  a  lance bearing a strip of rawhide with the 
words,   "Aqui  fue  Granada"—"Here was Granada,"   for Granada 
had been completely devastated.12 
Here  again at Granada,   the  fighting spirit  and 
recklessness  of the Americans was  illustrated.     Calvin 
O'Neal,   after seeing  his  brother  fall to enemy  fire,   secured 
Henningsen's  approval  to  lead a  charge  against  enemy posi- 
tions   forming near the Church of San Francisco.     Henningsen 
provided O'Neal with  thirty-two hand-picked men.     O'Neal 
and  his men  charged  straight  into  a  formation with reckless 
abandon. 
The slaughter made by the thirty-two 
rifles was fearful, and so far were O'Neal and 
his men carried by the 'rapture of strife' that 
it was difficult for Henningsen to recall them 
to the Plaza.  When they did return, it was 
through streets almost blocked witJ3the bodies 
of the Guatemalans they had slain. 
Because Walker had abandoned Granada, the symbol of 
authority in Nicaragua, he now had successfully to defend 
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the transit route or remain without any base of operations 
in Nicaragua.  Walker decided to concentrate his forces at 
Rivas and await reinforcements by way of the San Juan River 
or San Juan del Sur.  Walker occupied Rivas without a fight 
on December 16.  Generals Canas and Jerez had abandoned 
Rivas upon hearing of Henningsen's relief at Granada by 
Colonel Waters and had decided to join Belloso at Masaya. 
Walker's recent military successes were not indicative 
of growing Allied military strength in Nicaragua.  He had 
defeated canas near San Juan del Sur, had struck hard at 
Masaya, had successfully destroyed Granada, and had finally 
taken Rivas without so much as firing a shot—but time was 
running out. Walker's vital artery, the San Juan River, 
was about to fall to Costa Rican forces. 
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CHAPTER VII 
THE   CAMPAIGN FOR THE   CONTROL  OF THE   SAN JUAN RIVER 
Walker  had unwittingly made an enemy of  the most 
powerful man  in the United States  in  the  1850's—Cornelius 
Vanderbilt.     Unfortunately for Walker,   he  had become a 
friend     of Cornelius  Garrison and  Charles Morgan,   two 
agents of the Accessory Transit  Company,  which had been 
established by Vanderbilt.     Morgan and Garrison desired  for 
themselves  control of  the Accessory Transit  Company,   and 
they needed Walker's  aid to assure themselves  of securing 
control.     They lent  the Rivas  Government of Nicaragua 
$20,000,   provided Walker with access  to  lake and  river 
steamers,   provided  free passage  for  recruits  to Nicaragua, 
and promised  continued aid.     By thus   aiding Walker  in his 
conquest  of Nicaragua,   they enlisted Walker  into their 
services. 
Garrison and Morgan pursuaded Walker to revoke the 
original charter of the Accessory Transit Company and to 
recharter transit rights through Nicaragua to them.  Walker 
in turn pursuaded President Rivas to sign both the revocation 
(February 18, 1856) and the new charter (February 19. 1856). 
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This proved to be Walker's most fatal mistake while in 
Nicaragua.  He had angered the great and powerful Cornelius 
Vanderbilt.  Vanderbilt subsequently plotted the downfall 
of Walker in order to secure the reinstatement of the 
original charter which allowed him trans isthmian rights. 
Through two agents, William Robert Webster, an Englishman, 
and Sylvanus H. Spencer, an American, Vanderbilt pursuaded 
President Mora to follow a plan which he would finance. 
He had decided that the best way to topple Walker was to 
block his main artery, the San Juan River, and thereby shut 
off the flow of supplies and recruits into Nicaragua, and 
he had the right man for this task in Sylvanus Spencer. 
Not only did Spencer know every detail of the San Juan 
River (he had been a steamboat captain on the river), but 
he was also very angry with Walker.  The rich stock he owned 
in the Accessory Transit Company was worthless as a result 
of Walker's revocation of the original charter. 
*Because Spencer's part in the San Juan River Campaign 
is so important, his family background provides an interest- 
ing backdrop.  He was the son of John Canfield Spencer who 
was the Secretary of War under President Tyler.  But his broth- 
er Midshipman Phillip Spencer was hung at the yardarm of the 
United States brig-of-war Somers for mutiny in 1842, ana 
achieved the dubious distinction of being the only officer 
in the United States Navy ever to be executed for mutiny. 
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Spencer personally took charge of one expeditionary 
force and  departed San Jose,   Costa  Rica,   on December 10. 
Spencer and his   120 men entered the San Juan River  at  the 
confluence  of the San Carlos  River  and  the San Juan River. 
From  there  they floated down river to within a  short dis- 
tance of the very  strategically located Hipp's  Point,   a 
fort  at the  junction of the San Juan River  and the 
Serapiqui River.     Knowing  that Hipp's  Point was well 
fortified on the river and  practically undefended  in the 
rear.  Spencer  led his  men  inland  and attacked  from the rear, 
capturing Hipp's  Point  in  less  than  five minutes.     The  fifty 
American  defenders  offered  little  resistance,   as  their 
weapons were stacked.     They were eating a meal  and  no 
guards had been posted in  the  rear.    After  successfully 
taking Hipp's  Point  on December  23,   Spencer and his men 
employed  a tactic of  floating down river on rafts  and com- 
pletely surprised the  crews  of  four river  steamers  at Punta 
Arenas  2    (across  the  river  from Greytown). 
Spencer  then traveled back up the San Juan River and 
effected  a  link-up with an additional  1,100 troops  under 
General Jose'joaquin Mora   (brother of President Mora of 
Costa Rica).     They captured the  lightly defended Castillo 
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Viejo and  then tricked the commander of Fort San Carlos 
into surrender.     When Spencer  and General Mora gave the 
standard arrival  signal  to Fort San Carlos  from aboard 
the  captured  steamer  La Virgen,   Captain Kruger,   commander 
of the  fort,   came  out to greet La Virgen.     He was met by 
Spencer and Mora who  demanded  he  surrender  the  fort or 
else  forfeit  his   life.     Thus  Fort San  Carlos,  which 
occupied a  commanding position on a bluff at a  point where 
the San Juan  River  joins  Lake Nicaragua,  was  surrendered 
to Spencer  and Mora without a  fight. (See map H) .3 
On January  2,   1857,  Spencer and Mora  captured the 
fastest,   largest,   and  last of the  lake steamers,   the San 
Carlos.     With the  capture  of the  lake  steamers,   the  forts, 
and  the San  Juan River,  Walker for all practical purposes 
was  shut off  from  contact with the  outside world. 
William Walker was  unaware of all  these  events  tak- 
ing place  on the  San  Juan River,  but  it was  only a matter 
of  time before he would  have  to surrender  to the Allies, 
as  they now  controlled all of Nicaragua except  the environs 
of Rivas  and San Juan del Sur.    Walker made his   last des- 
perate stand at Rivas while waiting for expected reinforce- 
ments  to arrive via  the San Juan River  from Greytown.     The 
reinforcements  did arrive  in Nicaragua,   and had  it not been 
MAP  H 
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for some faulty judgment on the part of Colonel H. T. Titus, 
commanding a band of reinforcements, the San Juan River 
might have been recaptured and Walker successfully reinforced, 
Colonels S. A. Lockridge, H. T. Titus, and Frank P. 
Anderson recaptured Hipp's Point on February 13, 1857. 
Colonel Titus then took charge of operations to retake 
Castillo Viejo. 
Castillo Viejo occupied a strategic position, as it 
was built on a steep hill and stood in a curve of the San 
Juan River.  At its feet, the river was interrupted by 
unnavigable rapids.4 Moreover, the fort had been well con- 
structed to balance its natural advantages. 
The fort was formed of two heavy stock- 
ades, one close to the water, the other higher 
up.  The walls were made of large logs laid 
lengthways, one above the other, secured by 
heavy posts stuck in the ground.  Embrasures 
were made for the guns and the line of walls 
was zigzagged in and out to allow the defenders 
to fire along the outside of the walls. 
With 180 men, Titus easily took the lower defenses 
of the fort.  Upon receiving a demand from Titus that the 
fort surrender. Captain Cauty, an Englishman commanding 
Castillo Viejo with only 30 men, replied that he needed 
twenty-four hours to request permission to surrender from 
his superior at Fort San Carlos.  For some reason Titus 
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agreed,   but   in  twenty-four hours  Castillo Viejo had been 
reinforced  and Titus was  forced to retreat.    Titus  never- 
theless   could  have  taken the  fort practically without a 
fight  in February,   but one month later,  Lockridge  found  it 
too heavily guarded  and decided that the  fort was not worth 
the  risks  of  an  assault.6 
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CHAPTER VIII 
THE  SURRENDER  OF WILLIAM WALKER'S   FORCES   AT  RIVAS 
Because of Rivas'   strategic  location near the transit 
route,  Walker  decided  to prepare Rivas  as  a  final defensive 
position and to wait  there  for expected reinforcements. 
Under the  guidance  of Henningsen,   Rivas became what  it  should 
have been to the Costa Rican  forces—practically an  impreg- 
nable  fortress.     It was  defended by stone barricades  and 
eleven pieces  of ordnance—two mines,   three  six-pounders, 
two howitzers,   and  four mortars.1    Henningsen also ordered 
that a wide  swath be  completely cleared around Rivas, 
leaving excellent  fields  of  fire  for the  artillery and 
riflemen. 
With his  army of  518  fit soldiers.  Walker was  able 
to resist  the Allied  army,   approximately  7,000 men,   from 
January to May  1.     Not  only were they able  to withstand a 
formidable  siege  for  a  considerable  length of  time,   but  the 
American Phalanx was  also able  to mount  several small 
offensive operations.    The American Phalanx struck Obraje 
once on January 25  and assaulted San Jorge  four times- 
January 29,   February 3,   February 11,   and March  16.     None 
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of these  assaults  was  successful  in taking  their objective; 
however,   they did  show that even though the small American 
Phalanx  had nearly been  surrounded at Rivas,   it was not 
ready to  roll  over  and die. 
By the middle of March,   however,   the Allies  had  com- 
pletely surrounded  Rivas  and undertaken siege operations. 
Again,   the American  Phalanx showed  its  still  formidable 
fighting  spirit and proved that  a  small group of men in 
Rivas  could withstand the assault of a much  larger  force. 
On both March  23  and April  11,   the American Phalanx re- 
pulsed two Allied assaults,   inflicting heavy  losses.     The 
Allied assault on April  11 did carry one  side of the  lower 
Plaza,  but  the Allies were  driven out.     This became the 
last engagement of  the war.     The Allies  realized  it would 
be foolish to try to carry Rivas by assault,  so they under- 
took a holding operation  to starve the American Phalanx 
into  surrendering. 
The  end to Walker's  presidency came May 1,   1857,  when 
William Walker  and  the American Phalanx surrendered to 
Commander  Charles  H.   Davis  of the United States  sloop-of- 
war,  St.  Mary's.     Commander Davis  had arrived off San Juan 
del Sur on February 6 under orders  to protect American lives 
and property,  but  to remain strictly neutral.    According to 
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Lawrence Greene, a historian in the twentieth century, he 
was to do what he could, unofficially, to get Walker out 
of Nicaragua.2  On April 24, under a flag of truce, women 
and children had been safely evacuated from Rivas. On 
April 30, Walker agreed to surrender to Commander Davis 
under guarantee that he and his men be safely escorted out 
of Nicaragua under the protection of the United States 
flag. 
Walker really did not have an alternative to surrender 
for a number of reasons.  First, he had only enough food 
on hand to sustain his men and himself for two or three 
more days.  Second, Henningsen had told Commander Davis of 
the possibility that the American Phalanx could breach the 
siege lines of Rivas and escape to San Juan del Sur and 
board their one ship "navy," the Granada.  Davis informed 
him, however, that he would not allow the Granada to sail 
out of the harbor.  Third, there was positively no hope of 
new recruits arriving to reinforce the American Phalanx. 
Fourth, as each day went by. Walker's force was being con- 
stantly drained by death, disease and desertion.  Of the 
919 men Walker had reported in his command in January, only 
463 surrendered May 1. 
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One wonders why the Allies permitted William Walker 
to  leave Nicaragua  so easily when Walker's  eventual capture 
seemed  so  inevitable.     Canas,   commander of the Allied Army, 
was well  aware  of the situation he was   in.    First,   he knew 
he  could not  take  Rivas by assault.     Second,  while he was 
waiting  for Walker  to  capitulate due  to  lack of  food,   his 
own army was  also being reduced by death,   disease  and deser- 
tion.     Within the  past two months,   his besieging army had 
been reduced  from almost  7,000 men to approximately 2,000 
men.3    Third,   Canas  realized that dissension and bickering 
might at  any time break out among his various  nationalities 
and could  result  in  the  complete disintegration of his  army. 
General  Canas was,   therefore,  more than happy to allow 
Commander Davis  to undertake negotiations  and secure the 
surrender  of William Walker's  forces  at  Rivas. 
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CHAPTER  IX 
PERSONAL  EMPIRE   OR ANNEXATION 
TO  THE  UNITED STATES 
One  important   factor should be discussed.     Although 
William Walker was  a  product  of Manifest Destiny and believed 
strongly  in his  own destiny as  a  leader,   it   is  a debatable 
point whether  or  not  he  intended  for Nicaragua,  once  firmly 
under his  control,   to be annexed to the United States  or  to 
form the  first state  of  his  own private  empire.     In the 
opinion of this writer.   Walker was   firmly bent on establish- 
ing his  own empire  in  Central America,   separate  from and 
independent  of the United States. 
The  first proof of this  theory was  that when Walker 
revealed  his  plan of a  Central American Empire to C.  W. 
Doubleday,   Doubleday rejected the plan  and decided that he 
could no  longer  support Walker,   because  he,   himself,  was 
sincerely  interested  in  helping  the Nicaraguan people.1 
It was  obvious  to Doubleday that Walker was  only  interested 
in himself and  his  own aspirations  of grandeur. 
More  evidence of Walker's  empire-building plans was 
shown  in his   inaugural address  on July  12,   1856,  when he 
93 
apparently was  warning England  and the United States  to 
keep away  from Nicaragua. 
In our relations with the more powerful 
nations  of  the world,   I  hope  that  they may be 
led  to perceive  that  although Nicaragua may 
be  comparatively weak,   she  is yet   jealous  of 
her honour and determined to maintain the 
dignity of her   independent  sovereignty.     Her 
geographical  position and  commercial advantages 
may attract  the  cupidity of other governments, 
either neighboring or distant....I  trust  that 
they may  yet   learn that Nicaragua  claims  to 
control  her  own destiny and does  not  require 
other nationalities  to make treaties  con- 
cerning  her  territory without  asking  her 
advice or  consent.2 
In this  statement.  Walker was directly speaking  to England 
and the United States who had taken  it upon themselves to 
adopt the Clayton-Bulwer Treaty by which they assumed the 
right to  fix  the boundaries  of Nicaragua without  consulting 
the republic.     This   in  itself  indicates  that Walker  intended 
to maintain Nicaraguan sovereignty. 
Probably the  greatest  indication that Walker  in- 
tended to establish his  own empire came to  light  in a  letter 
written by Walker to Domingo de Goicouria,  his Minister to 
England,   concerning the policy Goicouria should pursue as 
Minister.     Although the  letter was written August  12,   1856, 
it was  not until  November  24,   1856,   that  the  letter appeared 
in print  in the  New York Herald. 
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Goicouria,   a  Cuban patriot,   had traveled  to Nicaragua 
to offer  his  aid to Walker   in return  for Walker's  helping 
him to  free  his  native  Cuba  from Spanish domination.    Walker 
accepted his help,  but Goicouria became disillusioned with 
Walker  soon after  his  arrival  in Nicaragua.     Walker,   however, 
persuaded Goicouria  to go  to England to be  the  Nicaraguan 
Minister  to the  Court  of Saint James.     On his way to England, 
Goicouria  decided  to  remain  in New York  for a time.    While 
in New York,   he attempted to settle  differences between 
Vanderbilt  and Walker  over  the revoked Nicaraguan charter. 
Vanderbilt was willing  to settle the quarrel,  but after 
Goicouria   informed Walker  of Vanderbilt's willingness. 
Walker bluntly told Goicouria that he  did not need his  ad- 
vice or help.     At this,   Goicouria  completely broke with 
Walker.     He then decided to publish a  letter revealing 
Walker's  empire  intentions. 
The  letter  reads,   in part. 
With your  versatility,   and  if  I  may use 
the term,   adaptability,   I expect much to be done 
in England.     You  can do more than any American 
could possibly accomplish,  because  you  can make 
the British cabinet  see  that we  are not engaged 
in any scheme  for  annexation.     You  can make  them 
see  that  the  only way to  cut the expanding  and 
expansive democracy of the North  is by a power- 
ful and compact Southern  federation,  based on 
military principles....Tell ,  
95 
he must  send me the  news  and  let me know 
whether  Cuba must and shall be  free,  but 
not   for  the Yankees.     Oh,   nol     that  fine 
country  is  not   fit  for  those barbarous 
Yankees.     What would such a psalm-singing 
set  do  in the   island?^ 
This must  have been a blow to ardent expansionists,   for  it 
does  seem to  indicate Walker's  true purpose.    Walker not 
only wanted  a military  federation led by him but also 
wanted  a barrier  to any  further  southward expansion by the 
United States. 
As   further proof.  Walker decreed on September 22, 
1856,   that  all   laws  and decrees which had been passed by 
the Federation of  Central American States  from 1824  to 1838 
and continued  in  force   in the new Nicaraguan Constitution 
were now null  and void.     One  of the acts  of the Federation 
of  Central American States  had been the  abolition of slavery, 
and now with Walker's  decree  of September 22,   it became 
possible to reintroduce  slavery  in Nicaragua.     To Walker, 
slavery was  a means  to an end.     He wanted to  induce 
Americans  to colonize  the  land,   and this  could only be 
accomplished with  either contract or slave  labor.     Further- 
more,  Walker  stated that another object  of  the decree was 
"to bind the Southern States  to Nicaragua as   if she were 
one of  themselves."4    This  slave republic in Central America 
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would have  the  same  aims  and aspirations  of the  southern 
United States,   and thus  the two areas would be  closely 
drawn together. 
As  an  indication of  his  complete  takeover and inten- 
tions.  Walker redesigned the Nicaraguan flag and coined the 
motto,   "Five or none."    The motto would seem to indicate 
that  he meant to bring  all  five  nations   in Central America 
under his  domination.      (See  illustration  6). 
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ILLUSTRATION   6 
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CHAPTER X 
CONCLUSION 
Whether or  not Walker desired to establish a military 
federation  in Central America under his  domination,   he did 
accomplish the very astounding  feat  of  leading a  filibus- 
tering expedition  of  57 men to Nicaragua  and bringing the 
country under  his   sway within four months.    Walker did not 
lead the  filibustering  expedition as  an agent of  slavery 
expansionists  or as  a tool  of capitalistic enterprise.     He 
did so only at  the  encouragement  of Byron Cole and with the 
hope of  realizing  a dream—that of fulfilling his  destiny. 
Because Walker  dreamed,   acted upon his  dreams,   and yet 
failed,   he   is  the  subject of much criticism.     If,  however, 
he  had  succeeded  in his mission—either  having Nicaragua 
annexed to  the United States or establishing a prosperous 
and stable  empire of his  own  in Central America with 
Nicaragua as   its  keystone-William Walker would probably 
today be  considered a hero.     Be  that as   it may.  Walker 
failed. 
in the  opinion of this writer,   it   is valid  to point 
out errors which Walker made   in the  fields of military 
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tactics,   administration of  justice,   and appointment of 
officials.     This writer does not  feel  that Walker should 
either be criticized or praised for his decision to lead 
a  filibustering expedition  to Nicaragua.     Walker was  only 
acting and  reacting  to opinions  and pressures of the era 
of Manifest Destiny in the  1850's. 
Thus,   a  hypothetical question arises.     How could 
William Walker  fail so disastrously and miserably after 
having accomplished  so much in so short a  time?    In the 
first place.  Walker quite  simply was  no military tactican. 
In only two  instances  did he  show signs  of using strategy 
and tactics  to  his  advantage. 
The  first  instance was  his most sensational exploit-- 
the routing  of the Legitimists   from Granada.     He had steamed 
from Virgin Bay up Lake Nicaragua,   and captured Granada, 
the capital  city,  while  the  city had been  left practically 
undefended by the Legitimists  in order to concentrate their 
forces  at  Rivas   in an attempt to destroy Walker. 
The only other use of good military strategy occurred 
when Walker  tried to prevent the Allied armies  from linking 
up.     He accomplished this by quickly moving  from Granada to 
the transit route where  he defeated the Costa Rican army 
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near San Juan  del Sur.     He  then  returned to Granada one day 
later and  attacked the Allied  forces  at Masaya the next day. 
Although Walker  is  given the  credit  for this  second campaign, 
probably much of  the  credit  for  its  success  should be given 
to  Charles  Frederick  Henningsen's military brilliance. 
In  several  instances.  Walker's  horrendous  decisions 
did much to destroy the American Phalanx.     In three  cases, 
Walker simply gave up practically impregnable  cities—Rivas, 
Managua,   and Masaya—without  a  fight.     In addition,  as  soon 
as the enemy took two of the  cities—Rivas  and Masaya— 
Walker decided  that  he  did need the position and subsequently 
tried to  recapture  the  same  city he had voluntarily given 
up only days  earlier.     Walker was guilty of not  learning 
from his mistakes.     He seems  never to have  learned that he 
could not  successfully race  into a city such as Masaya or 
Rivas  and  seize  the  defended  central  Plaza.    What usually 
happened  in these  cases was  that Walker's men would seize 
the  Plaza while  the enemy would surround the American 
Phalanx by occupying  the buildings outside  the  Plaza.     They 
would then force the Americans to fight their way out of 
the city.     That situation should certainly have happened 
only once,   but  it  happened  four  times-twice at  Rivas and 
twice at Masaya. 
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Walker was  able,   however,  to capitalize even on these 
mistakes because of the  ineptitude  of the Allied generals. 
Not only did they allow him to break out  of their encircle- 
ments  in his   "slam-bang"  attacks  on these  cities,  but also 
they never  tried  to  pursue and scatter his  retreating army. 
Even when Colonel  Schlessinger was  so horribly defeated at 
Santa Rosa,   the  Costa  Ricans  did not attempt any pursuit. 
However,   the  greatest  indictment that  can be laid against 
any general  occurred during  the Costa Rican occupation of 
Rivas.     The  Costa  Rican general allowed corpses  to  lie 
unburied and  indiscriminately to be thrown into drinking 
wells.     Naturally,   disease  and death ran rampant through    the 
ranks of the  Costa  Ricans.     Out of about 4,000 troops  that 
crossed the Nicaraguan border,  only approximately 500 returned 
to Costa Rica,   and most  of the deaths were due  to disease 
resulting  from cholera. 
In addition  to unfortunate military decisions. Walker 
also was  guilty of administrative mismanagement.     He  failed 
miserably  in  two  crucial appointments—one  a military 
appointment  and the other a ministerial designation.    Walker 
appointed Louis  Schlessinger  as battalion commander of his 
invasion force into Costa Rica.    Schlessinger proved to be 
one of the most  inept military commanders  on either side 
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during  the Filibuster War.     He  also appointed Birkett D. 
Fry as Minister to the United States,   and this  poor  choice 
probably helped  influence Secretary of State Marcy to refuse 
to extend diplomatic recognition to the Rivas-Walker Govern- 
ment. 
Even  though executions  seemed to be an  easy solution 
to Walker's  political  problems,   the detrimental  long range 
effects more  than offset any short range gain.     This   is 
shown by the  executions  of Mateo Mayorga and  Ponciano Corral. 
Walker used  the  execution of Mayoraga to secure the surren- 
der of Corral's   forces  in October,   1855.     He  then effectively 
used the execution of  Corral as  an example to others  not  to 
attempt to commit  treason against the state.     In the  long 
run,   however,   the two executions  simply made martyrs  of 
Corral and Mayorga and  increased public resentment against 
the American  filibusters. 
Foremost among walker's  failures was his inability 
to realize  that  Cornelius vanderbilt was  the man who could 
make or break his  position  in Nicaragua.    Walker not only 
revoked Vanderbilt's  charter on the Accessory Transit Company, 
but  he also refused Vanderbilt's offer of $250,000  in return 
for restoring the original charter which gave vanderbilt 
the  transit rights  he wanted.*    Because  of this,   Cornelius 
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Vanderbilt  sponsored  and  financed Spencer's expedition to 
sever Walker's   control  of the San Juan River—his vital 
lifeline.     Therefore,   at the expense  of American money and 
men,  Walker  lost  control of the San Juan River because he 
refused  to mend his  differences with Vanderbilt.     He had 
made  the  fatal mistake of trying to tangle with Cornelius 
Vanderbilt. 
But even with these  shortcomings.  Walker had three 
undeniable  assets.     Even though it did not appear  that he 
had the physical  stature to be a  leader,  William Walker 
possessed the   inborn ability to guide and shape the destinies 
of men.     His  uncanny piercing steel-gray eyes  persuaded 
many to  follow him to their graves.     There was  an old 
Indian myth which  stated that one day a man with gray eyes 
would come who would deliver them from the oppressive yoke 
of Spanish servitude.     Walker took  full advantage  of this 
myth and  his  gray eyes  to persuade many Indians  to support 
him. 
Much of the  success  that Walker enjoyed depended 
upon the  fighting ability of his  soldiers  and their willing- 
ness  to  perform under  hostile  fire.     There  have been several 
examples  already mentioned,  but C.  Frederick Henningsen 
after the Civil War  in the United States quite succinctly 
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describes  the bravery of the American Phalanx. 
I was  on  the Confederate side  in many 
of the bloodiest battles  of the  late war;  but 
I  aver that   if,   at  the end of that war,   I had 
been allowed to pick  five thousand of the 
bravest  Confederate or Federal soldiers  I 
ever saw,   and could resurrect and pit against 
them one thousand of such men as  lie beneath 
the  orange  trees  of Nicaragua,   I  feel  certain 
that  the thousand would have  scattered and 
utterly routed  the  five  thousand within an 
hour.     All military science  failed,   on a 
suddenly given  field,  before assailants who 
came  on at  run,   to close with their revolvers, 
and who thought  little of charging  a battery, 
pistol  in hand....  Such men do not  turn up in 
the  average  of  everyday life,   nor do  I ever 
expect to see  their  like again.2 
William Walker was   indeed the prince of the  fili- 
busters  of  the  1850's  until  his  death,   on a third try to 
occupy Central America,   in  1860  in Honduras.     Due to the 
strategic  importance  of Nicaragua,  Walker  created much 
consternation not only  in Central American nations,  but 
also   in  "the capitals of Washington and London."     It  is  no 
doubt true  that William Walker would be better remembered 
today  if the War Between the States  in the United States 
had not  occurred.     The mass  of names  and heroes arising 
from that  conflict   far overshadow one  filibuster's  successes 
and  failures  in the Central American nation of Nicaragua  in 
the  1850's. 
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FOOTNOTES 
CHAPTER X 
Baughman, Charles Morgan, p. 82. 
2Edward S. Wallace, "The Gray-Eyed Man of Destiny," 
American Heritage;  The Magazine of History, December, 1957, 
p. 125. 
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APPENDIX A 
COMRADES   OF  WILLIAM WALKER 
Sam Absalom 
Frank P.  Anderson 
A.  S.  Brewster        f 
Francisco Castellon 
Byron Cole 
captain Creighton 
Timothy Crocker 
Charles W.  Doubleday 
Callender  Irvine Fayssoux 
Fermin Ferrer 
Parker H.  French 
Birkett D.  Fry 
Cornelius  Garrison 
Charles  H.   Gilman 
Domingo de  Goicouria 
Charles Frederick  Henningsen 
Maximo Jerez* 
Patrick Jordan 
Achilles  Kewen 
Captain Kruger 
Captain Legaye 
J.  W.  Livingstone 
S.  A.  Lockridge 
James  H.   Mclntosh 
Jose Machado 
Colonel Markham 
Charles Morgan    m 
Jose' Trinidad Munoz 
Bruno von Natzmer 
Major O'Neal 
Calvin O'Neal 
Captain Prange 
Felix Ramirez* 
Patricio Rivas* 
Antony Francis  Rudler 
Mariano Salazar* 
Edward J.   Sanders 
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Louis Schlessinger 
Major Swingle 
D. W. Thorpe 
H. T. Titus 
Captain Turnbull 
Jose' Maria Valle 
Augustin Vijil 
William Walker 
John Waters 
John Wheeler 
..,„ walker to aiding the 
*Those who switched from aiding WalXer 
Allied cause. 
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THOSE   OPPOSED   TO  WALKER 
Ramon Belloso   (a Salvadoran) 
Manuel  Bosque 
Alejandro Bulow 
Jose Maria  canas   (a Costa Rican) 
George  Cauty 
Fruto Chamorro 
Ponciano ,Corral 
Jose Maria Estrada 
Santos  Guardiola   (a Honduran) 
Captain Gutierrez   (a Costa Rican) 
Tomas  Martinez 
Mateo Mayorga 
Juan Joaquin Mora   (a  Costa Rican) 
Juan Rafael Mora   (a Costa Rican) 
General Salazar   (a Costa Rican) 
Sylvanus  H.   Spencer 
Cornelius vanderbilt 
William Robert Webster 
Pedro Xatruch   (a Honduran) 
Jose' Victor Zavala   (a Guatemalan) 
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APPENDIX  B 
IMPORTANT  DATES   OF   THE FILIBUSTER WAR 
December  29,   1854 
May 4,   1855 
June 16, 1855 
June  23,   1855 
June 29, 1855 
July 12, 1855 
August  29,   1855 
September  3,   1855 
October 13, 1855 
October  17,   1855 
October 19, 1855 
October 22, 1855 
October  23,   1855 
William Walker  approved colonization 
grant  sent  to him by Byron Cole for 
settlement  in Nicaragua. 
The Vesta departed from San Francisco, 
California for Realejo, Nicaragua with 
Walker and  fifty-seven other Americans. 
The Vesta  reached Realejo. 
The Vesta with Walker and the American 
Phalanx  sailed  for the transit route. 
The American Phalanx repulsed at Rivas, 
Walker returned to Realejo. 
The American Phalanx returned to San 
Juan del Sur. 
The American Phalanx defeated the 
Legitimists at Virgin Bay. 
Walker  captured Granada. 
Parker French and Birkett Fry un- 
successfully attempted to capture 
Fort San Carlos. 
A  "massacre"  occurred at Virgin Bay. 
Mateo Mayorga  executed. 
Walker and Ponciano Corral  signed a 
neace treaty ending hostilities be 
Keen the Legitimists  and Democrats. 
October 30, 1855 
November 8, 1855 
February 18, 1856 
February 19, 1856 
March 1, 1856 
March 13, 1856 
March 20, 1856 
March 30, 1856 
April 5, 1856 
April 7, 1856 
April 9, 1856 
April 11, 1856 
April 29, 1856 
June 10, 1856 
June 29, 1856 
July 12, 1856 
July  18,   1856 
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Patricio Rivas  inaugurated as 
President. 
Corral executed for treason. 
Charter  of the Accessory Transit 
Company revoked. 
Charles Morgan and Cornelius Garrison 
granted charter  for trans isthmian 
privileges  through Nicaragua. 
President Juan Rafael Mora of Costa 
Rica  declared war on the  filibusters 
in Nicaragua. 
Nicaragua declared war on Costa Rica. 
Louis Schlessinger defeated by Costa 
Rican Army at Santa Rosa. 
Walker occupied Rivas. 
The American Phalanx abandon Rivas. 
Rivas  occupied by Costa Rican troops. 
Walker decided to return to Rivas. 
Walker defeated at Rivas. 
General Jose' Maria. Canas abandoned 
Rivas  due  to a cholera epidemic. 
dismissed as President patricio Rivas 
of Nicaragua by Walker. 
Walker e lected President of Nicaragua. 
Walker inau gurated. 
Treaty of alliance signed between 
Honduras, El Salvador and Guatemala. 
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September   22,   1856 
September  24,   1856 
October  1,   1856 
October  12,   1856 
October  12,   1856 
October  13,   1856 
October,   1856 
November   1,   1856 
November   7,   1856 
November  12,   1856 
November 13,   1856 
November 15-17,   1856 
November 18,   1856 
November 19,   1856 
November   24,   1856  - 
December   14,   1856 
December   16,   1856 
All  acts  and decrees of the 
Federation of Central American States 
declared null  and void. 
Managua abandoned by the American 
Phalanx. 
Masaya  abandoned by the American 
Phalanx. 
Walker attacked Masaya. 
Granada attacked by elements of the 
Allied Army. 
Allied Army routed at Granada by 
Walker. 
Charles Frederick Henningsen arrived 
in Nicaragua. 
President Mora of Costa Rica declared 
war  on the Walker  regime  in Nicaragua. 
San Juan del Sur occupied by Costa 
Rican Army. 
Costa Rican Army defeated by the 
American  Phalanx near San Juan del Sur. 
Walker returned to Granada. 
Walker defeated at Masaya. 
American  Phalanx retreated to Granada. 
American  Phalanx began evacuation of 
Granada. 
American Phalanx besieged at Granada 
by  the Allied Army. 
Rivas  occupied by Walker. 
118 
December 23, 1856 
December 24, 1856 
December, 1856 
December, 1856 
January 2, 1857 
January 25, 1857 
January 29, 1857 
February 3, 1857 & 
February 11, 1857 
February 13, 1857 
February, 1857 
March, 1857 
March, 1857 
March 23, 1857 
April 11, 1857 
May 1,   1857 
Hipp's  Point captured by the Costa 
Ricar.s. 
Steamers captured at Puntas Arenas 
by Costa Rican expedition. 
Castillo Viejo fell to the Costa 
Ricans. 
Fort San Carlos occupied by the 
Costa Ricans. 
Costa Ricans capture steamer San 
Carlos. 
American filibusters repulsed at 
Obraje. 
Filibusters repulsed at San Jorge. 
Filibusters again repulsed at San 
Jorge. 
Filibusters retake Hipp's Point. 
Filibusters unable to capture 
Castillo Viejo. 
Filibusters again fail to take 
Castillo Viejo. 
Rivas, headquarters for Walker, 
surrounded by the Allied Army. 
Allies repulsed at Rivas. 
Allies again repulsed at Rivas—this 
was the last engagement of the Fili- 
buster War. 
William Walker and the American 
Phalanx surrender to Commander Davis 
of the United States Navy. 
